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DEADLY DRONES, DUE PROCESS, AND
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
William Funk*
INTRODUCTION
On September 30, 2011, allegedly on the orders of President Barack Obama, an
American drone fired a missile at a truck in the desert of Yemen, killing Anwar al-
Awlaki and Samir Khan, two American citizens, as well as other al-Qaeda leaders,
including Ibrahim al-Asiri, a top al-Qaeda bomb maker. Awlaki and Khan had been
notorious propagandists on behalf of al-Qaeda, credited with drawing numerous re-
cruits to jihad against the United States. Subsequently, the American Civil Liberties
Union and The New York Times sought to obtain a copy of any legal opinion justifying
that drone strike, but, not surprisingly, their request was denied and their Freedom of
Information Act suits have not yet been successful.1 Nevertheless, on February 4, 2013,
NBC News posted a leaked Department of Justice “White Paper”2 on the legality of
drone targeting of U.S. citizens, and President Obama authorized members of the
congressional intelligence committees to have access to the Office of Legal Counsel
opinion justifying the use of drones to target and kill U.S. citizens who are senior oper-
ational leaders of al-Qaeda.3 That opinion remains classified at this time and unavailable
to the public. On May 23, 2013, the President addressed an audience at the National
Defense University4 where he described the administration’s counterterrorism policies,
including its policies regarding the use of drones for targeted strikes against al-Qaeda
leaders even if they are American citizens. Nevertheless, his speech did not address
* Robert E. Jones Professor of Law, Lewis & Clark Law School.
1 See N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 915 F. Supp. 2d 508 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(rejecting suit); ACLU v. CIA, 710 F.3d 422 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (remanding to district court
after rejecting the government’s Glomar denial).
2 See DEP’T OF JUSTICE: WHITE PAPER: LAWFULNESS OF A LETHAL OPERATION DIRECTED
AGAINST A U.S. CITIZEN WHO IS A SENIOR OPERATIONAL LEADER OF AL-QA’IDA OR AN ASSO-
CIATED FORCE (undated) [hereinafter WHITE PAPER], available at http://msnbcmedia.msn.com
/i/msnbc/sections/news/020413_DOJ_White_Paper.pdf.
3 See Michael D. Shear & Scott Shane, Congress to See Memo Backing Drone Attacks
on Americans, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/07/us/politics
/obama-orders-release-of-drone-memos-to-lawmakers.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
4 Located at Fort McNair in Washington, D.C., the National Defense University is
“America’s pre-eminent institution for national security and joint professional military edu-
cation . . . .” About Us, NAT’L DEF. U. FOUND., http://www.ndufoundation.org/page.aspx
?pid=327 (last visited Dec. 12, 2013).
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the legal justification for such strikes other than to say that the targeting of American
citizens for death must comply with due process.5 Consequently, as of this writing,
the White Paper is currently the best statement of the administration’s legal case for
drone strikes against U.S. citizens.
The White Paper raises a number of legal issues. Among these are whether the
President has the authority to order such killings; whether various criminal statutes or
the Executive Order banning assassination would prohibit such operations; and whether
the operations would violate international law. This Article, however, will only address
the questions: whether, and if so how, the Fourth Amendment6 and the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment7 would constrain these operations.
The Article will begin by describing the operations in question and the procedures
the administration has put in place to authorize them and relate the arguments con-
tained in the White Paper regarding the requirements of due process and the Fourth
Amendment. The Article will then critically assess those arguments and raise some
additional ones. Ultimately, the Article concludes that whether or not due process
and the Fourth Amendment require any changes to the procedures, the constitution-
ality of any drone strikes targeted against U.S. citizens would be better assured if the
administration instituted additional procedures designed to assure the reliability of the
information upon which it acts. Moreover, the institution of such recommended pro-
cedures should not impede the effectiveness of the drone program, much less require
its termination.
I. THE PROGRAM
The use of drones by the military and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has
been much in the news. Initially designed for surveillance, drones, particularly the
Predator drone, have increasingly been used for targeted strikes against ground targets
using air-to-surface missiles. While their predominant use has been against “military”8
targets within Afghanistan and Pakistan, they have also been widely used for targeted
killing away from the battlefield and its immediate environs. The first report of a
drone strike killing a U.S. citizen was in 2002, when Kemal Darwish was killed by a
Hellfire missile fired from a Predator drone in Yemen that killed six persons.9 While
5 See Barack Obama, Pres. of the U.S., Remarks by the President at the National Defense
University (May 23, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks
-president-national-defense-university [hereinafter Remarks by the President].
6 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
7 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
8 The word “military” is in quotation marks because these targets involve suspected com-
batants in the war in Afghanistan, rather than persons simply connected to al-Qaeda in some
leadership position.
9 See Philip Smucker, The Intrigue of the Drone Strike, CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR (Nov. 12,
2002), http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/1112/p01s02-wome.html.
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the target was Qaed Salim Sinan al-Harethi, the alleged ringleader of the plot to bomb
the U.S.S. Cole, Darwish was wanted at the time as a suspect for allegedly recruiting
the “Lackawanna Six,” six Yemeni-Americans convicted of providing material support
to al-Qaeda. The first and only targeting of a U.S. citizen involved al-Awlaki, but his
son, also an American citizen, was also killed by a drone a few weeks later, although
it is unlikely that he was the target.10 Nevertheless, with the War on Terror showing
no signs of ending and with al-Qaeda’s active recruitment of American Muslims, more
Americans are likely to be in the cross-hairs in the future, although the total number
is also likely to remain small.
Under the program described in the White Paper, the administration will target a
U.S. citizen in a foreign country for lethal attack by a drone missile if the person is a
“senior operational leader of al-Qa’ida or an associated force”; if an “informe[d] high-
level official of the U.S. government determine[s] that the targeted individual poses
an imminent threat of violent attack against the United States”; if capture of the per-
son is “infeasible”; and the attack would be consistent with “applicable law of war
principles.”11 The White Paper does not define who an “informed; high-level official”
would be.12 Inasmuch as drone strikes currently may be carried out either by the CIA
or the Defense Department, one might imagine that the high-level official would be a
high-level official in one or the other agency, but we know that the President himself
authorized the strike against al-Awlaki.13 Other sources describe the processes for
targeting that differ somewhat between the CIA and the Defense Department, but
which can only be described as highly bureaucratic.14
The White Paper does not elaborate on who qualifies as a “senior operational
leader of al-Qa’ida,” and it does not identify what may be “associated force[s].”15
Again, other administration sources suggest that an “associated force” has two char-
acteristics: “(1) it is an organized, armed group that has entered the fight alongside
al Qaeda, and (2) it is a cobelligerent with al Qaeda in hostilities against the United
States or its coalition partners.”16
The White Paper does explain its understanding of what an imminent threat is.17
Somewhat contrary to the normal meaning of “imminent,” the White Paper states that
an imminent threat does not mean “clear evidence that a specific attack on U.S. persons
10 See Charlie Savage & Peter Baker, Obama, in a Shift, to Limit Targets of Drone Strikes,
N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/23/us/us-acknowledges-killing
-4-americans-in-drone-strikes.html?pagewanted=all.
11 WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 1.
12 Id.
13 See Remarks by the President, supra note 5.
14 See Richard Murphy & Afsheen John Radsan, Notice and an Opportunity to be Heard
Before the President Kills You, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. (forthcoming).
15 WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 1.
16 Jeh C. Johnson, National Security Law, Lawyers, and Lawyering in the Obama
Administration, 31 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 141, 146 (2012).
17 WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 7.
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and interests will take place in the immediate future.”18 It cites to a 2004 speech by
Lord Goldsmith, the Attorney General of the United Kingdom, before the House of
Lords explaining Her Majesty’s interpretation of Article 51 of the United Nations
Charter.19 That Article recognizes a nation’s right of self-defense in response to an
armed attack, but he explained that this right is not limited to when an armed attack
has already occurred.20 It includes “the right to use force in anticipation of an immi-
nent armed attack.”21 Moreover, the “concept of what constitutes an ‘imminent’ armed
attack will develop to meet new circumstances and new threats.”22 “[T]he right of
self-defence [exists] and . . . force might, in certain circumstances, be used in self-
defence against those who plan and perpetrate such acts and against those harbouring
them, if that is necessary to avert further such terrorist acts.”23 This suggests that the
“imminent threat of violent attack”24 includes the current planning of violent attacks in
the future. The White Paper confirms this, saying that “an individual poses an ‘immi-
nent threat’ of violent attack against the United States where he is an operational leader
of al-Qaeda or an associated force and is personally and continually involved in plan-
ning terrorist attacks against the United States.”25 In addition, if the person has “recently
been involved in activities posing an imminent threat of violent attack against the
United States, and there is no evidence suggesting that he has renounced or abandoned
such activities,” then his actions would support the conclusion that he poses an im-
minent threat.26
Finally, the White Paper explains that capture would not be feasible “if it could
not be physically effectuated during the relevant window of opportunity or if the rele-
vant country were to decline to consent to a capture operation.”27 The White Paper con-
tinues that “[f]easibility would be a highly fact-specific and potentially time-sensitive
inquiry,” which might include consideration of the risk to U.S. personnel in a potential
capture operation.28 President Obama in his speech at the National Defense University
described “some of these places—such as parts of Somalia and Yemen—[are where]
the state only has the most tenuous reach into the territory. In other cases, the state
lacks the capacity or will to take action.”29
18 Id.
19 Id. (citation omitted).
20 See 660 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2004) 370 (U.K.) (referring to the testimony of
Attorney-General Lord Goldsmith), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa
/ld200304/ldhansrd/vo040421/text/40421-07.htm.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 1.
25 Id. at 8.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Remarks by the President, supra note 5.
2013] DEADLY DRONES, DUE PROCESS, AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 315
II. THE ADMINISTRATION’S LEGAL ARGUMENTS
The White Paper assumes that “the rights afforded by [the] Fifth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause, as well as the Fourth Amendment, attach to a U.S. citizen even
while he is abroad,”30 citing Reid v. Covert,31 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,32
and In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in East Africa.33 With respect to due
process, the White Paper refers to the invocation by the plurality opinion in Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld34 of the balancing test in Mathews v. Eldridge.35 In Hamdi, the plurality de-
scribed that test as involving the “weighing [of] ‘the private interest that will be af-
fected by the official action’ against the Government’s asserted interest, ‘including the
function involved’ and the burdens the Government would face in providing greater
process.”36 The White Paper concedes that “[a]n individual’s interest in avoiding erro-
neous deprivation of his life is ‘uniquely compelling.’”37 On the other hand, the White
Paper asserts that “the government’s interest in waging war, protecting its citizens, and
removing the threat posed by members of enemy forces is also compelling.”38 From
this the White Paper concludes that “[i]n these circumstances, the ‘realities’ of the con-
flict and the weight of the government’s interest in protecting its citizens from an immi-
nent attack are such that the Constitution would not require the government to provide
further process” than the White Paper describes.39 Again, it quotes from the plurality
opinion in Hamdi to distinguish the process due for actions “on the battlefield” from
those in which the United States detains persons in areas subject to the jurisdiction of
U.S. courts.40 And finally, the White Paper once more quotes from the plurality opin-
ion in Hamdi for the proposition that courts should “accord[ ] the greatest respect and
consideration to the judgments of military authorities in matters relating to the actual
prosecution of war, and . . . the scope of that discretion necessarily is wide.”41
With respect to the Fourth Amendment, if one assumes that killing a person is a
“seizure” within the meaning of that amendment, the White Paper asserts that “the in-
trusion on any Fourth Amendment interests would be outweighed by the ‘importance
of the governmental interests [that] justify the intrusion.’”42 Drawing on the case of
30 WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 5.
31 354 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1957) (plurality opinion).
32 494 U.S. 259, 269–70 (1990).
33 552 F.3d 157, 170 n.7 (2d Cir. 2008).
34 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004).
35 WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 5–6; 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
36 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529 (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335).
37 WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 6 (quoting Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 178 (1985)).
38 Id. (citing Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 531).
39 Id.
40 Id. at 7 (citing Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 534).
41 Id. (quoting Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 535).
42 Id. at 9 (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985)).
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Tennessee v. Garner43 and Scott v. Harris,44 the White Paper argues that even in domes-
tic law enforcement it is not unconstitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by using
deadly force where the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm.45 Consequently,
abroad and under the circumstances outlined in the White Paper, the use of lethal force
would likewise not violate the Fourth Amendment.46
III. ASSESSING THE ADMINISTRATION’S ARGUMENTS
A. Constitutional Rights Abroad
The administration’s assumption that “the rights afforded by the Fifth Amend-
ment’s Due Process Clause, as well as the Fourth Amendment, attach to a U.S. citizen
even while he is abroad” is not as obvious as one might think.47 Certainly the Supreme
Court has never so held. This is not to say that these amendments and other provi-
sions of the Bill of Rights necessarily cease to exist outside the United States, but it
does mean, for example, that what is “reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment and
what is “due” process under the Fifth Amendment may be affected by the fact that the
search or seizure or deprivation of life, liberty, or property occurs outside the sover-
eign jurisdiction of the United States. The White Paper cites to Reid v. Covert,48 but
Reid’s message is unclear. As Justice Harlan wrote in Reid v. Covert:
I do not think that it can be said that these safeguards of the
Constitution are never operative without the United States, regard-
less of the particular circumstances. On the other hand, I cannot
agree with the suggestion that every provision of the Constitution
must always be deemed automatically applicable to American citi-
zens in every part of the world. . . . The proposition is, of course,
not that the Constitution “does not apply” overseas, but that there
are provisions in the Constitution which do not necessarily apply
in all circumstances in every foreign place. In other words, it seems
to me that . . . there is no rigid and abstract rule that Congress, as
a condition precedent to exercising power over Americans over-
seas, must exercise it subject to all the guarantees of the Consti-
tution, no matter what the conditions and considerations are that
would make adherence to a specific guarantee altogether imprac-
ticable and anomalous.49
43 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
44 550 U.S. 372 (2007).
45 WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 9.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 5.
48 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
49 Id. at 74 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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Justice Harlan’s opinion, of course, was not the opinion of the Court, but neither
was the opinion of Justice Black, who appeared to take a more categorical approach,
stating that:
At the beginning we reject the idea that when the United States acts
against citizens abroad it can do so free of the Bill of Rights. . . .
When the Government reaches out to punish a citizen who is
abroad, the shield which the Bill of Rights and other parts of the
Constitution provide to protect his life and liberty should not be
stripped away just because he happens to be in another land.50
However, this statement must be read in context. In Reid, two wives accompanying
their servicemen husbands abroad, one in Japan and one in England, were accused of
murdering their husbands.51 The status of forces agreements between the United States
and these countries provided that both military personnel and their accompanying de-
pendents accused of crimes in those countries would not be tried under those nations’
law but under American law by a military tribunal.52 The issue was whether a U.S. citi-
zen, not a member of the military, could be tried by military tribunal simply because
the crime occurred in a foreign land.53 The Court held she could not, but there was no
majority opinion.54 The plurality opinion, written by Justice Black, distinguished the
so-called Insular Cases,55 which had held that jury trials were not required in unin-
corporated territories despite the language of Article III, Section Two,56 and the Sixth
Amendment.57 Those cases, he wrote, “involved the power of Congress to provide rules
and regulations to govern temporarily territories with wholly dissimilar traditions and
institutions whereas here the basis for governmental power is American citizenship.”58
Moreover, he also distinguished Madsen v. Kinsella,59 which also involved a trial by
a military tribunal of a serviceman’s wife accused of murdering her husband, but in
Madsen, the Court, with but one dissenter, found no constitutional problem with trial
50 Id. at 5–6 (plurality opinion).
51 Id. at 3–4.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 4–5.
54 Id.
55 See Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138
(1904); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
56 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment,
shall be by Jury . . . .”).
57 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury . . . ”); Balzac, 258 U.S. at 313; Dorr, 195
U.S. at 149; Mankichi, 190 U.S. at 218; Downes, 182 U.S. at 287.
58 Reid, 354 U.S. at 14.
59 343 U.S. 341 (1952).
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by military tribunal.60 In Madsen, however, the murder and trial had occurred in
Germany while it was technically under military occupation, although in 1949 long
after the cessation of hostilities.61 Justice Black indicated that in an area under mili-
tary occupation the commander may utilize a military commission to try anyone in
the area.62 In other words, despite Justice Black’s seemingly categorical statement as
to the applicability of the Bill of Rights abroad, his opinion recognized at least two
different justifications for dispensing with at least one of those rights—the right to a
jury trial.
There are two aspects of Justice Black’s opinion that are notable and relevant to
the issue of drones. First, in distinguishing Reid from the Insular Cases and Madsen,
he iterated the source of the claimed governmental authority. He said, “[H]ere the basis
for governmental power is American citizenship.”63 That is, the only basis upon which
the United States could act to deprive the defendant of her liberty was that she was an
American citizen; it had no other justification to assert jurisdiction over her. In the
Insular Cases, the source of authority was the power to make law for territories, which
only incidentally would apply to U.S. citizens who happened to be present there.64 In
Madsen, it was the authority to govern an area of military occupation, which again
only incidentally would apply to U.S. citizens who happened to be there.65 The target-
ing of drones against high-level members of al-Qaeda would seem to have more in
common with the latter cases than Reid. Whatever the source of authority is for tar-
geting drones against such persons,66 it does not arise from our authority over our own
citizens. Rather, if the person targeted is a U.S. citizen, that would be merely incidental
to an otherwise lawful targeting.
The other aspect of Justice Black’s opinion that is relevant is its recognition that
there were no extenuating circumstances requiring an exception from an otherwise ex-
isting constitutional right. The crimes and trials in Reid occurred during peacetime in
friendly countries, and no one could claim that Japan or England would care whether
we tried the wives by military tribunals or civilian juries. In short, while there might be
some minor inconvenience involved in moving the trials to some place in the United
States, this was not a justification for eliminating the right to such a trial. In a later case,
dealing with non-capital trials of military dependents abroad, the Court reiterated the
lack of any extenuating circumstances that might affect the applicability of the right.67
60 Id. at 362.
61 Id. at 343–45.
62 Reid, 354 U.S. at 35 n.63.
63 Id. at 14.
64 Id. at 13.
65 Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 362 (1952).
66 The White Paper argues that the lawful basis for the drone strikes generally derives from
the President’s constitutional authority to protect the nation and the Authorization for Use of
Military Force passed by Congress. WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 1.
67 See Kinsella v. U.S. ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 249 (1960).
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With respect to the drone targeting, there are a number of extenuating circum-
stances that might affect the applicability of constitutional rights to U.S. citizens abroad.
While the use of drones outside the field of battle in a conventional sense may not pro-
vide the same extenuating circumstances as their use on the field of battle, their use
in parts of the world where it is difficult and exceedingly dangerous for U.S. forces,
much less conventional law enforcement, to go raises similar concerns.
Reid and the cases it refers to all involve the question of the right to a trial by
jury protected by both Article III and the Sixth Amendment.68 In each of those cases
the person received some sort of trial, just not a trial by jury. Drone targeting with the
intent to kill a U.S. citizen does not involve any sort of trial. Even if Reid and the sub-
sequent cases expanding upon its limited decision might not require a trial by jury
before such targeting, there remains the question whether due process would require
something more than simply a decision by an “informed, high-level official of the U.S.
government.”69 Even the Insular Cases, perhaps the broadest statements concerning
the freedom of the government to act abroad unconstrained by all the particulars of the
Bill of Rights, drew the line at what they called “fundamental rights.”70 As the Court
stated in Balzac v. Porto Rico:
The Constitution . . . contains grants of power and limitations
which in the nature of things are not always and everywhere appli-
cable, and the real issue in the Insular Cases was not whether the
Constitution extended to the [unincorporated territories] . . . , but
which of its provisions were applicable by way of limitation upon
the exercise of executive and legislative power in dealing with new
conditions and requirements. The guaranties of certain fundamental
personal rights declared in the Constitution, as, for instance that no
person could be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law, had from the beginning full application . . . .71
Nothing the Supreme Court has said since then has suggested the contrary.72
The White Paper also cites United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,73 which involved
Fourth Amendment rights, but that case merely references Reid and indeed takes pains
68 See supra notes 59–65 and accompanying text.
69 WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 1.
70 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1957) (citing Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138,
144–48 (1904)).
71 258 U.S. 298, 312–13 (1922).
72 See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 639 (2008) (holding that Guantanamo Bay
detainees enjoy the “freedom from unlawful restraint as a fundamental precept of liberty . . . ”
despite the fact that Guantanamo is outside sovereign U.S. territory); Reid, 354 U.S. at 8–9
(“[I]t has been suggested that only those constitutional rights which are ‘fundamental’ protect
Americans abroad . . . .”).
73 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
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to stress that the plurality’s statement of the extent of constitutional rights abroad was
not the holding of the Court.74 Rather, the Court said: “What we know of the history
of the drafting of the Fourth Amendment . . . suggests that its purpose was to restrict
searches and seizures which might be conducted by the United States in domestic
matters.”75 Nevertheless, four Justices in concurring or dissenting opinions did indicate
their belief that the Fourth Amendment’s restriction to reasonable searches applies
abroad.76 While the Supreme Court has never directly held that the Fourth Amendment
applies abroad, every circuit to have considered the issue, like In re Terrorist Bombings
of U.S. Embassies in East Africa,77 the last case cited by the White Paper for the prop-
osition that the rights afforded by the Fourth Amendment apply abroad, has held that
it does.78 These courts, however, have not required a prior judicial warrant, instead re-
quiring only that the search be reasonable.79
To summarize, despite the frequent citation of Reid v. Covert for the proposition
that constitutional rights apply to U.S. citizens abroad,80 the Court did not so hold.
The split decision there was limited to the right to have a jury trial under the circum-
stances involved, and those circumstances have only been slightly enlarged over time.
Nevertheless, there is strong support in the case law, even if no direct holding by the
Supreme Court, that fundamental due process would apply abroad before the govern-
ment could take the life, liberty, or property of an American citizen. Similarly with re-
spect to the Fourth Amendment, the Court has never held that the Fourth Amendment
applies abroad, and indeed has suggested that the warrant requirement does not apply
abroad.81 Nonetheless, the basic requirement that a search or seizure be “reasonable”
has been held by a number of lower courts to apply to government actions abroad
against American citizens.
B. Due Process Clause
The issue is probably not whether the Due Process Clause applies to a citizen
abroad, but rather to what extent the Due Process Clause applies in the particular
circumstance of a drone strike. The White Paper addresses the due process question
through the lens of the Court’s Mathews v. Eldridge82 balancing test. While that test was
established in the consideration of a run-of-the-mill administrative law case, which
might give pause to its applicability regarding the requisite procedures to authorize a
74 See id. at 269–70.
75 Id. at 266.
76 Id. at 276, 279.
77 552 F.3d 157, 170 n.7 (2d Cir. 2008).
78 See United States v. Conroy, 589 F.2d 1258, 1264 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Rose,
570 F.2d 1358, 1362 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 280–81 (2d
Cir. 1974).
79 See In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in East Africa, 552 F.3d at 167.
80 See, e.g., Conroy, 589 F.2d at 1264.
81 See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 259, 278 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
82 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
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military drone strike, a plurality of the Supreme Court did use that test in the context
of the procedures applicable to the indefinite detention of U.S. citizens believed to be
enemy combatants.83 As the administration concedes, the private interest of the in-
dividual target for killing is at the zenith; there can be no higher private interest. The
administration responds, however, by saying that the government’s interest “in wag-
ing war, protecting its citizens, and removing the threat posed by members of enemy
forces”84 is also at the highest level. But to phrase the government’s interest in that
way is somewhat disingenuous. That is, killing the particular individual involved, even
assuming he is as dangerous as the government believes, only removes the threat posed
by that individual. At best it marginally affects that protection from and threat posed
by the enemy generally. The same could be said for domestic terrorists or murderous
criminals. That is, one could say that the government interest in protecting its citizens
from domestic terrorists or murderous individuals in the United States is also of the
highest order, but no one would suggest a shoot-to-kill order directed against a person
identified by a senior administration official as such a person in the United States would
be justified. Nevertheless, it must be accepted that the government’s interest in dis-
abling foreign terrorists leaders associated with al-Qaeda is substantial.
In the Mathews balancing test, the most important component is the one that medi-
ates between the private interest and the government interest by assessing the ade-
quacy of the existing procedures to guard against the risk of error in the government
determination and the probable value of additional procedural safeguards to reduce that
risk.85 The White Paper does not even acknowledge this component of the Mathews
test, although it repeats language from the plurality opinion in Hamdi to the effect
that in the circumstances of war the risk of erroneous deprivation in the absence of suf-
ficient process is very real.86 The White Paper’s sole response is that “the realities of
combat” must also be considered in assessing the burdens the government would face
in providing greater process to the target of a proposed drone strike and that these
realities “are such that the Constitution would not require the government to provide
further process to such a U.S. citizen before using lethal force.”87 However, the only
“process” identified in the White Paper is that “an informed, high-level official of the
U.S. government has determined that the targeted individual poses an imminent threat
of violent attack against the United States . . . .”88 This, of course, is no process at all;
it is a conclusion. We have some information concerning the process that precedes
that conclusion.89 Clearly, the decision is not made lightly, and it is based on all avail-
able information, including most likely information from confidential sources and/or
83 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529–34 (2004).
84 WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 6.
85 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529.
86 WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 6 (quoting Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529 (plurality opinion)
(“It is beyond question that substantial interests lie on both sides of the scale in this case.”)).
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 See Murphy & Radsan, supra note 14, at 11–12.
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electronic surveillance. Nevertheless, as the White Paper recognizes in quoting from
Hamdi, in the circumstances of war, especially a war carried out by clandestine orga-
nizations hiding from the public, the risk of error in determining that a particular per-
son is “a senior operational leader of al-Qa’ida or an associated force” who “poses an
imminent threat” is “very real.”90 Inasmuch as the Court in Hamdi, merely to detain
a person, required process beyond the determination of some official of the U.S. gov-
ernment that the person was an enemy combatant, it would seem that some process
beyond what seems contemplated in the White Paper would be required in order to
target a person for death.
There is one wrinkle, unidentified but perhaps alluded to in the White Paper.91
In every case raising questions regarding what process is due the person whose life,
liberty, or property is involved, the person is available for purposes of some sort of
proceeding to protect his interests. Simply none of the cases involve a situation where
the person is not only not available but affirmatively avoiding being present. Rather,
when a person is shot, seized, or injured in an attempt to bring the person under gov-
ernment control, it is the Fourth Amendment that is claimed to have been violated, not
the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.92 On the other hand, I have not been able
to find any case in which a court has said that the Due Process Clause is simply not
implicated when the person involved is not available for a proceeding. In Hamdi, the
plurality states that “[t]he parties agree that initial captures on the battlefield need not
receive the process we have discussed here; that process is due only when the deter-
mination is made to continue to hold those who have been seized.”93 However, this
statement does not by its terms say that initial captures do not require any due process,
only that they do not require the process identified by the Court as necessary for indef-
inite detention. Moreover, it is highly unlikely that ordinary captures on the battlefield,
including Hamdi’s own, would involve the knowing and intentional capture of a U.S.
citizen. Rather, like Hamdi, the citizenship of the captive would become known only
later, and the law is clear that non-citizens on the foreign battlefield do not enjoy any
rights under the Constitution.94 Nevertheless, even if it were known beforehand that
90 WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 1, 6 (quoting Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 530).
91 See id. at 7 (quoting Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 534 (“The parties agree that initial captures on
the battlefield need not receive the process we have discussed here; that process is due only
when the determination is made to continue to hold those who have been seized.”)).
92 See, e.g., Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 374 (2007) (involving police utilizing potentially
deadly force to apprehend a fleeing speeder); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989)
(discussing a claim of excessive use of force by police in arresting subject); Tennessee v.
Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985) (involving circumstance in which police shot and killed a fleeing
burglary suspect); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881–82 (1975) (involving
temporary detention of persons in automobile); Terrell v. Smith, 668 F.3d 1244, 1251 (11th Cir.
2012) (considering situation in which police shoot and kill person attempting to flee in car);
see also DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, RUBY RIDGE TASK FORCE
REPORT 4–5 (June 10, 1994) (assessing constitutionality of FBI sniper’s shooting to kill).
93 542 U.S. 507, 534 (2004).
94 See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 775 (1950).
2013] DEADLY DRONES, DUE PROCESS, AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 323
a particular combatant on the battlefield was a U.S. citizen, it is inconceivable that
some sort of prior due process proceeding would be required in order to capture him.
After all, no due process proceeding is required before seizing an American citizen in
the United States.95 Again, the issue would be the constitutionality of the seizure under
the Fourth Amendment.
The above may suggest that a due process analysis is simply inapplicable with
respect to a drone strike against a U.S. citizen and that the only issue is whether the
strike violates the Fourth Amendment. However, there is general language in some
cases that if the seizure (or detention) is for the purposes of punishment, then due
process applies.96 Popular reporting of drone strikes on U.S. citizens suggests that
the government is imposing a death penalty on someone without a trial.97 The White
Paper states that a necessary precondition to use of a drone strike against an American
citizen is that capture is infeasible.98 This indicates that the drone strike is in lieu of
capture, which would be preferred, and consequently suggests that the strike is not
intended to be punishment. President Obama was more explicit: “America does not
take strikes when we have the ability to capture individual terrorists; our preference
is always to detain, interrogate, and prosecute . . . . America does not take strikes to
punish individuals . . . .”99
The capture of Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame off the coast of Yemen in 2011, his
prosecution and guilty plea in federal court,100 and the recent capture of Sulaiman Abu
95 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1967) (holding that an officer needs only reasonable
suspicion to conduct a seizure).
96 See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979) (considering a challenge to the con-
ditions of pretrial detention).
97 See, e.g., Mark Mazzetti et al., How a U.S. Citizen Came to Be in America’s Cross Hairs,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/10/world/middleeast/anwar-al
-awlaki-a-us-citizen-in-americas-cross-hairs.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (claiming the U.S. gov-
ernment had carried out the deliberate killing of an American citizen as a wartime enemy and
without a trial); Erin McClam, ‘Judge, Jury and Executioner’: Legal Experts Fear Implications
of White House Drone Memo, NBC NEWS, http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/02/05
/16855539-judge-jury-and-executioner-legal-experts-fear-implications-of-white-house-drone
-memo?lite (last visited Dec. 12, 2013) (suggesting White House is acting as judge, jury, and
executioner). Senator Angus King stated at confirmation hearings for John Brennan as Director
of the Central Intelligence Agency: “Having the executive being the prosecutor, the judge,
the jury and the executioner, all in one, is very contrary to the traditions and the laws of this
country.” Editorial, A Court for Targeted Killings, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2013), http://www
.nytimes.com/2013/02/14/opinion/a-special-court-is-needed-to-review-targeted-killings.html.
98 WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 1.
99 Remarks by the President, supra note 5.
100 See Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, S.D.N.Y., Guilty Plea Unsealed in New York
Involving Ahmed Warsame (Mar. 25, 2013), available at http://www.fbi.gov/newyork/press
-releases/2013/guilty-plea-unsealed-in-new-york-involving-ahmed-warsame-a-senior-terrorist
-leader-and-liaison-between-al-shabaab-and-al-qaeda-in-the-arabian-peninsula-for-providing
-material-support-to-both-terrorist-organizations.
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Ghaith in Jordan and his extradition to the United States for trial are significant evi-
dence for the truth of this assertion.101 Thus, absent an intent to punish, drone strikes
may well be viewed as simply not subject to due process concerns but rather are ap-
propriately viewed as seizures, the constitutional protection for which arises from
the Fourth Amendment rather than the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Nevertheless, sometimes popular perceptions become a framing device, so it is not in-
conceivable that the strikes could be judged to be punitive and thus requiring analysis
under the Due Process Clause.
C. The Fourth Amendment
As discussed above, the applicability of the Fourth Amendment to citizens abroad
is not well established, but the body of lower court case law supports a finding that it
does apply to searches and seizures abroad of U.S. citizens.102 The extent of its protec-
tion, however, is less clear. The Fourth Amendment ensures “[t]he right of the people
to be secure in their persons” against “unreasonable . . . seizures” and requires that war-
rants shall only issue upon probable cause.103 In Tennessee v. Garner,104 the Supreme
Court decided that the use of deadly force against a fleeing felon was a “seizure” within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.105 The White Paper cites to Garner in support
of its targeting drone strikes against American citizens because the Court there said that
an officer could use deadly force to prevent escape of a suspect where there is “probable
cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm.”106 This was
a limitation on the common-law rule that deadly force could be used to prevent the es-
cape of any fleeing felon.107 The Garner Court focused on the Amendment’s require-
ment that the seizure be “reasonable” to assess whether the use of deadly force in the
particular circumstances was constitutional. There, where the fleeing suspect was con-
cededly not perceived to be dangerous to the pursuing officers or the public, the Court
held the use of deadly force was unreasonable.108 Rather, the Court held that “[w]here
the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious phys-
ical harm, either to the officer or to others, it is not constitutionally unreasonable to
101 See Marc Santora & William K. Rashbaum, Bin Laden Relative Pleads Not Guilty in
Terrorism Case, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/09/nyregion
/sulaiman-abu-ghaith-bin-ladens-son-in-law-charged-in-new-york.html.
102 See United States v. Conroy, 589 F.2d 1258, 1264 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Rose,
570 F.2d 1358, 1362 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 280–81 (2d
Cir. 1974).
103 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
104 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985).
105 Id.
106 WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 9 (citing Garner, 471 U.S. at 11).
107 See Garner, 471 U.S. at 12–15.
108 Id. at 11, 21 (“Where the suspect poses no immediate threat to the officer and no threat
to others, the harm resulting from failing to apprehend him does not justify the use of deadly
force to do so.”).
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prevent escape by using deadly force.”109 Because two of the conditions for drone tar-
geting are that the citizen poses an “imminent” threat of violent attack and it is infea-
sible to capture the person, the White Paper argues that the targeting falls within the
requirements of Garner. The White Paper also cites Scott v. Harris.110 In that case the
Court upheld the constitutionality of the police ramming a speeding automobile that
would not pull over when pursued by the police with flashing lights and sirens.111 The
Court posed the question: “Can an officer take actions that place a fleeing motorist at
risk of serious injury or death in order to stop the motorist’s flight from endangering the
lives of innocent bystanders?”112 The answer was, yes, he may. In Scott, the underlying
crime (speeding) was itself neither a felony nor inherently a threat to the physical safety
of others, but the actions taken by the person to avoid seizure caused a significant risk
to others.113 Those actions justified the use of potentially lethal force. The facts in Scott
are far removed from the drone targeting case, but the Court’s willingness to look at
the situation in context, rather than subject to some rigid doctrinal rule, as well as to
allow the police some leeway in making the decision as to the dangerousness of the
person’s actions, are both supportive of the administration’s conclusion that the Fourth
Amendment does not preclude targeting American citizens for drone attacks under the
listed conditions.
The White Paper, however, does not cite to Graham v. Connor,114 decided sub-
sequent to Garner, which is the case establishing the current “test” for assessing the
reasonableness of a seizure, and the test used in Scott.115 In Graham, the Court estab-
lished what it calls the “objective reasonableness” standard.116 There, the Court de-
scribed it thus: “Determining whether the force used to effect a particular seizure is
‘reasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment requires a careful balancing of ‘the nature
and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests’ against the
countervailing governmental interests at stake.”117 In addition, the Court suggested that:
[I]ts proper application requires careful attention to the facts and
circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of
the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat
to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively
resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.118
109 Id. at 11.
110 550 U.S. 372 (2007).
111 Id. at 381, 384.
112 Id. at 374.
113 Id. at 375, 380.
114 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
115 Id. at 388.
116 Id.
117 Id. at 396 (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)).
118 Id.
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The White Paper’s failure to cite Graham, however, does not diminish its Fourth
Amendment argument. As the Scott Court made clear, “Garner was simply an ap-
plication of [Graham’s] ‘reasonableness’ test . . . to the use of a particular type of
force in a particular situation.”119 Moreover, in Scott, the Court clarified that there is
no “magical on/off switch that triggers rigid preconditions” for when “deadly force”
may be used, and it explained the requirement of the subject posing a threat of serious
physical harm to others.120 This could be satisfied “when the suspect is known to have
‘committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical
harm,’ so that his mere being at large poses an inherent danger to society.”121
These cases, therefore, do provide substantial support for the administration’s
argument that drone targeting of U.S. citizens subject to the requirements described
in the White Paper is not a violation of the Fourth Amendment, but rather is consistent
with Supreme Court decisions regarding when deadly force may be used to “seize” a
person. There is, however, one major distinction between the Garner and Scott cases
and the situation involving the drone targeting. In Garner, the suspect was seen flee-
ing from a burglary;122 in Scott, the suspect was seen speeding and then fled from the
police.123 That is, there was no question that the person against whom the potentially
deadly force was used was indeed the person who committed the crime.124 The use of
deadly force is in lieu of arrest, so, as the Court has said, there must be at least “proba-
ble cause” to arrest the person against whom the deadly force is used.125 Where the
officer observes the commission of a crime and observes the threat to physical safety
the perpetrator creates, in the exigencies of the situation the officer has the necessary
probable cause and can act upon it.126 Otherwise, however, the probable cause to justify
an arrest would need to be determined by a neutral magistrate. Once a warrant has been
issued for the suspect’s arrest, and if the crime for which the warrant was issued is suf-
ficiently heinous that “his mere being at large poses an inherent danger to society,”127
then in attempting to arrest him deadly force might be used to prevent his escape.
The decision that a U.S. citizen meets the requirements to be targeted for a drone
strike is not done under exigent circumstances. All evidence suggests that it is a deci-
sion that is made only after careful study.128 In the domestic context, it is inconceivable
that police officials could have meetings and decide that a person has committed a par-
ticular crime and that any police officer may therefore use deadly force to apprehend
119 Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 382 (2006).
120 Id.
121 Id. at 382 n.9 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
122 Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 3 (1985).
123 Scott, 550 U.S. at 374–75.
124 See also Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 194–95 (2004) (per curiam) (involving a
felon fleeing in car).
125 See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).
126 See id.
127 Scott, 550 U.S. at 382 n.9.
128 Mazzetti et al., supra note 97.
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the person. The question, therefore, is why targeting a U.S. citizen for a drone strike
does not require an arrest warrant based on alleged crimes that would make the person
merely “being at large” to pose “an inherent danger to society.”129
One answer to that question might be that there is no magistrate with jurisdiction
to issue an arrest warrant applicable in another nation. There is strong support for
such an answer in the Court’s decision in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez.130 In
that case the issue was whether evidence obtained from a search of a non-citizen’s
home in Mexico should be suppressed because it was obtained in violation of the
Fourth Amendment.131 The Court’s opinion held that non-citizens are not protected by
the Fourth Amendment abroad, but the majority in passing stated that a search war-
rant issued by a magistrate in the United States “would be a dead letter outside the
United States.”132 Justice Kennedy, concurring, was more explicit, saying “the Fourth
Amendment’s warrant requirement should not apply in Mexico.”133 Justice Stevens,
also concurring, agreed: “I do not believe the Warrant Clause has any application to
searches of noncitizens’ homes in foreign jurisdictions because American magistrates
have no power to authorize such searches.”134 Even Justice Blackmun in dissent agreed
on this point: “[A]n American magistrate’s lack of power to authorize a search abroad
renders the Warrant Clause inapplicable to the search of a noncitizen’s residence out-
side this country.”135
Although in Verdugo-Urquidez the warrant at issue was a search warrant, the same
conclusion should apply to an arrest warrant. The Fourth Amendment does not distin-
guish between search warrants and arrest warrants; it refers only to one warrant.136 If
an American magistrate lacks any power to issue a search warrant applicable abroad,
then the magistrate would likewise lack any power to issue an arrest warrant applica-
ble abroad.137 It is true that these statements regarding the ability to obtain a warrant
occurred in the context of a case involving a non-citizen, but the Justices’ statements
as to the magistrate’s authority relied on the place where the search would take place
not the citizenship of the person to be searched.138 The only court of appeals case to
129 Scott, 550 U.S. at 382 n.9.
130 494 U.S. 259, 278 (1990).
131 Id. at 261.
132 Id. at 274.
133 Id. at 278 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
134 Id. at 279 (Stevens, J., concurring).
135 Id. at 297 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
136 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
137 It might be argued that the authorization is simply authorization to American officials,
over whom the magistrate presumably would have jurisdiction, to effect the arrest wherever it
can be made, but in Verdugo-Urquidez, the issue was whether the American officials who par-
ticipated in the search needed a search warrant. 494 U.S. at 261. If a magistrate could authorize
American officials to make an arrest abroad, he could likewise authorize American officials
to make a search abroad.
138 Id. at 266–67.
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assess whether a warrant requirement applies abroad as to American citizens is In re
Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in East Africa.139 It concluded, relying in large
part on Verdugo-Urquidez, that there is no warrant requirement abroad.140
If there is no warrant requirement abroad, the Fourth Amendment at most requires
the seizure abroad to be “reasonable.” This conclusion, however, simply returns us to
Graham’s “objective reasonableness” test, a test that is contextual, looking at all the
facts and circumstances, or, as the Court put it in Scott, “we must still slosh our way
through the factbound morass of ‘reasonableness.’”141
IV. UNCONSIDERED ARGUMENTS
If the Germans in World War II had fielded some military unit made up exclusively
of volunteer, native-born Americans,142 no one would have imagined that on the field
of battle they would have any constitutional rights. They would be enemy combatants
subject to being shot on sight under the laws of war (although not if they had surren-
dered and been reduced to being prisoners), and nothing in the Constitution would have
protected them. Anwar al-Awaki differed from these hypothetical soldiers in two ways.
First, he was not on a traditional field of battle, and second, he was not in a nation’s
military forces at war with the United States. The first difference is probably without
significance. After all, the saboteurs in Ex Parte Quirin143 were not in “the theatre or
zone of active military operations,” but the Court found that fact irrelevant to their
treatment as enemy belligerents.144 Moreover, one of them was a naturalized American
citizen, but again the Court found that fact irrelevant, saying that “[c]itizens who asso-
ciate themselves with the military arm of the enemy government, and with its aid,
guidance and direction enter this country bent on hostile acts, are enemy belligerents
within the meaning of the Hague Convention and the law of war.”145 As a result, he was
convicted by a military tribunal of having violated the laws of war, sentenced to death,
and executed.146 He and his confederates all had claimed certain rights under the U.S.
Constitution, which were rejected on the basis that those rights were never intended to
139 552 F.3d 157, 159 (2d Cir. 2008).
140 See id. An early district court case, Berlin Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld, held that the
Fourth Amendment required a prior judicial warrant for electronic surveillance of American citi-
zens in Germany. 410 F. Supp. 144 (D.D.C. 1976). In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies
in East Africa did not cite or address that case. See 552 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2008).
141 Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383 (2007).
142 Consider that the 442nd Regimental Combat Team was a unit of the U.S. Army in World
War II made up almost exclusively of Japanese-Americans, who under Japanese law qualified
for Japanese citizenship.
143 317 U.S. 1, 38 (1942).
144 See id.
145 Id. at 37–38.
146 Marshall Thompson, Comment, The Legality of Armed Drone Strikes Against U.S.
Citizens Within the United States, 2013 BYU L. REV. 153, 159–60.
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protect enemy belligerents who violated the laws of war.147 In short, an American citi-
zen who is a member of a nation’s military force at war with the United States is to be
treated in the same manner as any other member of that nation’s military force.
This brings us to the second difference between Anwar al-Awaki and our hypo-
thetical American citizen in the American unit of the German army in World War II:
Mr. al-Awaki was not a member of any nation’s military force, nor was the United
States at “war” in the same sense as it was in World War II. Today the struggle of
radical Islam, exemplified by al-Qaeda, against the “West” and all it stands for, is typi-
fied by acts of terror against both military and civilian targets. These acts, which have
been described by some as asymmetric warfare, might be treated simply as federal
crimes, and there are a number of federal criminal statutes that can be brought to bear
against such acts against American targets.148 On the other hand, they could be con-
sidered acts of “war,” properly responded to by military force.
When acts of terror occur domestically and without foreign support, our re-
sponse is domestic law enforcement, as in the prosecution, conviction, and execution
of Timothy McVeigh.149 However, when acts of terror occur domestically but with
foreign support or occur overseas but against American property or persons, we some-
times treat it as criminal conduct and sometimes as asymmetric warfare. For example,
the “shoe bomber” was prosecuted in federal court and is serving a life sentence in a
federal prison;150 Sulaiman Abu Ghaith is being prosecuted in the United States for acts
abroad constituting a conspiracy to kill Americans;151 and Wadih El-Hage was prose-
cuted in federal court and is serving a life sentence in federal prison for participation
in the bombing of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.152 Nevertheless,
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and four others are being tried as unlawful enemy combat-
ants by military commission for their participation in the planning of 9/11 and other
terrorist acts153 and Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri is being tried by military commission
147 Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 41, 45.
148 See, e.g., Robert M. Chesney, Who May Be Held? Military Detention Through the
Habeas Lens, 52 B.C. L. REV. 769, 799–800 (2011).
149 See generally Gregg W. Etter, Sr., Prosecuting Domestic Terrorists in the American
Court System: A Study of Three Cases, 2008 J. INST. JUST. INT’L STUD. 99.
150 See Pam Belluck, Unrepentant Shoe Bomber Sentenced to Life, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31,
2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/31/national/31SHOE.html.
151 See Benjamin Weiser, Bin Laden’s Son-in-Law Seeks a New Lawyer, but There’s a Snag,
N.Y. TIMES (May 20, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/21/nyregion/bin-ladens-son-in
-law-asks-to-change-lawyers.html.
152 See Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, S.D.N.Y., Wadih El Hage Resentenced to
Life in Prison for His Role in the 1998 Bombings of the American Embassies in Kenya and
Tanzania (Apr. 23, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/April13
/ElHagSentencingPR.php?print=1.
153 See Khalid Sheikh Mohammed Fast Facts, CNN (Feb. 13, 2013), http://www.cnn
.com/2013/02/03/world/meast/Khalid-sheikh-mohammed-fast-facts/index.html. Initially, in
the Bush administration, charges were brought against the defendants in a military commis-
sion, but President Obama directed that they be tried as criminals in federal court. Congress,
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in Guantanamo for planning the attack on the U.S.S. Cole.154 These varied responses
do not clearly and unequivocally suggest that we treat terrorist acts sponsored by al-
Qaeda and related organizations as in the nature of “war” or military conflict rather
than simply as federal crimes.
The Obama administration has indicated its preference for arrest and criminal
prosecution,155 but the fact that not all cases have been so handled leaves open the pos-
sibility that some cases involve military action rather than law enforcement action.
At the same time, every administration has justified the use of drone strikes as
well as the detention of terrorists at Guantanamo under the Authorization of the Use of
Military Force (AUMF),156 which reads more like a declaration of “war” or an autho-
rization under the War Powers Resolution157 than as providing greater powers to appre-
hend federal criminals abroad. In Hamdi,158 a majority of the Court held that actions
pursuant to the AUMF justified the detention of persons (including U.S. citizens)
as enemy combatants under the laws of war.159 Moreover, two other Justices said the
AUMF, “naturally speaks with some generality, but its focus is clear, and that is on the
use of military power. It is fairly read to authorize the use of armies and weapons,
whether against other armies or individual terrorists.”160 Here, the evidence is more
consistent, supporting the idea that actions against members of al-Qaeda and related
groups is military in nature, not law enforcement in nature.
If, indeed, the drone strikes are military in nature, rather than law enforcement in
nature, then arguments as to due process and the Fourth Amendment become virtual
nullities. The Constitution places no barriers on the targeting and killing of enemy bel-
ligerents in “war,”161 whether or not they are American citizens. Indeed, in Hamdi,
seven Justices appeared to agree that the only constitutional right Hamdi possessed
as an American citizen was the right of due process in determining whether he was in
fact an enemy belligerent.162 The logical consequence of this line of analysis is that
in effect, overruled that direction by forbidding any funds be used to transport the prisoners
from Guantanamo. As a result, they are again being tried by military commission.
154 See Peter Finn, Capital Charges Brought Against Guantanamo Detainee Abd al-Rahim
al-Nashiri in USS Cole Attack, WASH. POST (Apr. 20, 2011), http://articles.washingtonpost
.com/2011-04-20/world/35230489_1_nashiri-military-commission-military-justice.
155 See Remarks by the President, supra note 5.
156 Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
157 Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973).
158 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
159 Id. at 516–18 (O’Connor, J.); id. at 579 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
160 Id. at 547 (Souter, J.) (emphasis added).
161 The Uniform Code of Military Justice, federal statutes, and international law may
all impose some restrictions and conditions, but nothing in the Constitution would apply to
such action.
162 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 509 (O’Connor, J.); id. at 541 (Souter, J.) (stating that they would
have held that as a matter of statutory interpretation the AUMF did not authorize detention
at all); id. at 590 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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if a U.S. person is indeed an “enemy belligerent,” then he has no claim for protection
under either the Due Process Clause or the Fourth Amendment even though he is not
a member of a military force of a nation at “war” with the United States.
There is one more question that might be raised as to our hypothetical American
in the German military unit or the American citizen working for al-Qaeda. Is he a
citizen, or does he lose his citizenship by reason of his participation in the “war”
against the United States? Under the Fourteenth Amendment, a person born in the
United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof automatically becomes a citizen.163
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has made clear that a native-born citizen may re-
nounce his citizenship, but the renunciation must be voluntary.164 Congress has by
statute provided various ways in which the government can establish that a person has
renounced his citizenship.165 For purposes relevant here, a person may lose his citizen-
ship by “entering, or serving in, the armed forces of a foreign state . . . engaged in hos-
tilities against the United States,”166 under circumstances in which it was voluntary
and done with the subjective intent to renounce his citizenship.167
In Vance v. Terrazas,168 the Court made clear that the mere fact of voluntarily
engaging in the expatriating act—here, perhaps, acting on behalf of al-Qaeda—did not
prove the subjective intent to renounce U.S. citizenship, but Terrazas also made clear
that subjective intent could be proved by “a fair inference from proved conduct.”169
In Terrazas, the Court quoted positively from Justice Black’s concurring opinion in
Nishikawa v. Dulles,170 that the commission of the statutorily described expatriating
acts “may be highly persuasive evidence in the particular case of a purpose to abandon
citizenship,” but it cannot be conclusive evidence.171 Consequently, assuming that
acts on behalf of al-Qaeda would constitute “serving in[ ] the armed forces of a foreign
state . . . engaged in hostilities against the United States,” such acts could be strong
evidence of an intent to voluntarily renounce American citizenship.172 While prior to
Terrrazas there were a number of cases finding that service in a foreign military in-
deed constituted renunciation of citizenship, post-Terrazas apparently there is only one,
United States v. Schiffer.173 In that case, as well as in Breyer v. Meissner,174 in which
the court found insufficient evidence of renunciation of citizenship,175 there is language
163 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
164 See Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 257 (1967).
165 See 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (2006).
166 § 1481(a)(3).
167 See § 1481(a).
168 444 U.S. 252 (1980).
169 Id. at 260.
170 356 U.S. 129, 139 (1958).
171 Terrazas, 444 U.S. at 261.
172 § 1481(a)(3).
173 831 F. Supp. 1166 (E.D. Pa. 1993), aff’d without opinion in 31 F.3d 1175 (3d Cir. 1994).
174 214 F.3d 416 (3d Cir. 2000).
175 Id. at 431.
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suggesting that voluntary service in the foreign military, where such service involved
an oath of allegiance to a foreign power, was sufficient evidence, in the absence of
any countervailing evidence, to satisfy a finding of subjective intent to renounce U.S.
citizenship.176 Nevertheless, in Breyer, the appellate court found that there was insuffi-
cient evidence of voluntariness,177 and the rule appears to be that “evidentiary ambigu-
ities are not to be resolved against the citizen.”178
Under the statute it is clear that the loss of citizenship occurs at the time of the ex-
patriating act; it does not require an administrative or judicial determination to effect
the loss of citizenship.179 Thus, a high government official could determine that the tar-
get of the drone strike had voluntarily renounced his citizenship as provided in statute
and act on that basis without any necessity of proving the conclusion in any court or
administrative body. There is, however, a procedure by which a person whom the gov-
ernment has made a determination that the person is no longer a citizen can contest that
fact and have it resolved in court.180
For purposes here, there is the not insignificant question whether the statute’s lan-
guage, “serving in[ ] the armed forces of a foreign state,”181 can be read to include high-
ranking service in al-Qaeda. Given the uniform approach of the Court to construe
strictly statutes providing for loss of citizenship, it seems doubtful whether this pro-
vision for loss of citizenship could be used to eliminate issues relating to targeting a
U.S. citizen.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
The above analyses suggest that there are supportable arguments to justify the
constitutionality of the targeting of U.S. citizens as described in the White Paper. In
particular, it seems that due process would not be applicable unless the targeting was
for “punishment,” and there are facts supporting the claim that it is not done to punish
the person. Judicial decisions strongly support the conclusion that the Fourth Amend-
ment does not require any warrant for seizures abroad.182 Moreover, the doctrine allow-
ing for the use of lethal force against those whose escape would cause a significant
risk to human safety from physical violence can be invoked to justify the drone strikes
envisioned in the White Paper. Finally, characterization of al-Qaeda leaders as enemy
belligerents is consistent with how the United States sometimes treats them when it
obtains custody of them. If they are enemy belligerents, then their citizenship should
not matter in terms of the use of lethal force against them.
176 Id.; Schiffer, 831 F. Supp. at 1194–95.
177 Breyer, 214 F.3d at 431.
178 Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129, 136 (1958); see also Bruni v. Dulles, 235 F.2d
855, 856 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (“[F]actual doubts in expatriation cases are to be resolved in favor
of citizenship.”).
179 See 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (2006).
180 See § 1503(a).
181 § 1481(a)(3).
182 See supra notes 133–34 and accompanying text.
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However, a recurring issue is the reliability of the information the government acts
on and the conclusions the government draws from it. For example, if due process is
implicated, the weakest link in the government’s argument is the procedure (or lack
thereof) for assessing whether the person targeted is the person the government be-
lieves him to be.183 Similarly, one of the underpinnings of the justification for the use
of lethal force against a fleeing suspect is the inherent reliability of the information
the officer acts on—either as eyewitness of the serious crime, or of the fleeing person’s
possession of a weapon, or by the possession of a warrant for the arrest of the person
for a specified serious crime. Again, the weakest part of the government’s argument
here is the reasonableness of its determination of the status of the target absent such
inherent indications of reliability. Finally, the lawfulness of targeting the person as an
enemy belligerent depends on the person indeed being an enemy belligerent, and again
the procedure (or lack thereof) for making this determination puts this justification
at risk.
It is not clear why the government should not make its arguments much stronger
by instituting some procedure that would more greatly ensure the reliability of its deter-
minations. Recently, the President indicated that he was amenable to some additional
procedures and has asked his administration to explore various proposals.184 He indi-
cated two possible proposals: “the establishment of a special court to evaluate and
authorize lethal action” and “the establishment of an independent oversight board in
the executive branch.”185 The first of these, he said, “has the benefit of bringing a third
branch of government into the process, but raises serious constitutional issues about
presidential and judicial authority.”186 The second “avoids those problems, but may in-
troduce a layer of bureaucracy into national security decisionmaking, without inspiring
additional public confidence in the process.”187
An “oversight” entity usually reviews something after the fact, rather than pro-
viding a prior authorization, and there is currently “oversight” by the House and
Senate Intelligence Committees.188 Moreover, even if its charge was to approve tar-
gets in advance, it is not clear how something within the executive branch would be
“independent.”189
183 See, e.g., Murphy & Radsan, supra note 14 (describing in detail some of the problems
of reliability raised by the existing bureaucratic procedure).
184 See Remarks by the President, supra note 5.
185 Id.; see also Scott Shane, A Court to Vet Kill Lists, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2013, at A1 (“A
drone court would face constitutional, political and practical obstacles, and might well prove
unworkable, according to several legal scholars and terrorism experts.”).
186 Remarks by the President, supra note 5.
187 Id.
188 See id.
189 Murphy & Radsan, supra note 14, at 44–51. Murphy and Radsan propose a formal
adjudication generally following the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act, but
with an administrative judge, not an “independent” administrative law judge, whose decisions
would be subject to Presidential override. Id.; see also 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556–557 (2006).
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On the other hand, the already existing Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court190
would seem to be a natural resource to use to review and approve the executive’s deter-
mination of the appropriateness of the target. That court consists of eleven sitting dis-
trict court judges publicly designated by the Chief Justice of the United States.191 The
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, as amended,192 is already used to authorize elec-
tronic surveillance and physical searches and seizures for foreign intelligence purposes
in the United States.193 In addition, it authorizes certain electronic surveillance for for-
eign intelligence purposes of non-U.S. persons abroad.194 In other words, it is suitably
secure to see evidence from highly classified sources. It would provide independent,
neutral, judicial oversight to fulfill the same function as a magistrate who issues an
arrest warrant.
Some have suggested that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court is not a
sufficient safeguard even of electronic surveillance and physical searches in light of
its percentage approval rate of executive applications.195 These criticisms ignore the
fact that the approval rate may well reflect the care the executive takes before sub-
mitting an application—presumably a positive effect of having a prior, judicial ap-
proval requirement—as well as the fact that the percentage approval rate of all search
and arrest warrants by ordinary magistrates is extraordinarily high.196
The President and others have suggested that the use of a court, such as the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court, might raise constitutional issues about presidential and
judicial authority.197 It is difficult to see why in light of the now-three-decade history
of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, whose creation some believed also
raised constitutional issues.198 Congress has over time extended that court’s original
jurisdiction from electronic surveillance in the United States for foreign intelligence
Although there are a number of practical problems involved in their proposal, it is not clear
that such a prior approval mechanism would “inspir[e] additional public confidence,” even if
it would add an additional safeguard as to reliability. Remarks by the President, supra note 5.
190 See 50 U.S.C. § 1803 (2006).
191 Id.
192 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1802 (2006).
193 Id.
194 Id.
195 See, e.g., Erika Eichelberger, FISA Court Has Rejected .03 Percent of All Government
Surveillance Requests, MOTHER JONES (June 10, 2013, 10:30 AM), http://www.motherjones
.com/mojo/2013/06/fisa-court-nsa-spying-opinion-reject-request.
196 See, e.g., Title III Wiretap Orders, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER, http://
epic.org/privacy/wiretap/stats/wiretap_stats.html (last visited Dec. 12, 2013).
197 See supra notes 185–86.
198 Foreign Intelligence Electronic Surveillance Act: Hearings Before the Subcommittee
on Legislation of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence H.R., 95th Cong. 217, 221
(1978) (statement of Hon. Laurence Silberman) (“Now, although I am generally concerned
about the growth of judicial power at the expense of both congressional and Presidential
authority, I maintain that the administration’s bill, if passed, would be a particularly unfortunate
addition to this trend.”).
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purposes to physical searches for foreign intelligence purposes,199 the use of pen reg-
isters for foreign intelligence purposes,200 access to certain business records for foreign
intelligence and international terrorism investigations,201 and electronic surveillance
of certain foreigners abroad.202 Congress could well follow this same template to extend
the court’s jurisdiction to approving the use of lethal force against an American citizen
who is a senior operational leader of al-Qaeda or an associated force who poses an im-
minent or continuing threat of violent attack against the United States, where capture
is infeasible. The court would be performing a traditional judicial function: determin-
ing the reasonableness of a seizure under the Fourth Amendment as a prior condition
on that seizure taking place. In addition, such an extension would no more subject
what had been a purely executive determination to prior judicial approval than did the
original Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.203 As was the case there, even if the
Constitution does not require prior judicial approval, it does not forbid it.
The use of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to approve drone target-
ing of U.S. citizens abroad should not interfere with achievement of the government’s
goals. There is no exigency involved in the targeting of U.S. citizens, even if there
may be exigency once the target’s location has been determined. The rare decision to
target a U.S. citizen is made only after careful consideration and by a high official,
just as is the case with searches and surveillances under the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act.
CONCLUSION
In short, it seems clear that the Due Process Clause and the Fourth Amendment do
not pose any significant obstacles to the government’s ability to use lethal force against
leaders of al-Qaeda who are U.S. citizens. It may be that the government’s program as
it currently stands passes constitutional muster, but there are clearly substantial public
concerns and possibly significant weaknesses in the government’s justifications that
undermine the program’s constitutionality. Nevertheless, those weaknesses could be
virtually eliminated by the addition of the use of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court as an additional procedure to further assure the reliability of the government’s
determinations—a procedure already in place and functioning with respect to highly
classified matters—a procedure that would do nothing to impede the program and
would provide it substantial additional constitutional support.
199 See Pub. L. 103-359, tit. 8, § 807, 108 Stat. 3443 (1994).
200 See Pub. L. 105-272, tit. 6, § 601, 112 Stat. 2404 (1998).
201 See Pub. L. 105-272, tit. 6, § 602, 112 Stat. 2410 (1998).
202 See Pub. L. 110-261, tit. 7, § 702, 122 Stat. 2437 (2008).
203 Prior to the enactment of FISA, electronic surveillance in the United States for foreign
intelligence purposes was conducted under the President’s asserted authority to approve such
surveillances without judicial oversight. See United States v. Humphrey, 456 F. Supp. 51, 57
(E.D. Va. 1978) (describing pre-FISA history of electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence).
